year, the EPA approved essentially the same experiment' under the sponsorship of a private biotechnology company. 7 Again the release was challenged in federal district court, but this time Judge T.F. Hogan refused to grant an injunction. 8 These inconsistent outcomes are due in large part to inadequate regulatory guidelines.
In Part I, this note discusses the rapidly evolving science underlying the development of bioengineered microbes and the growing biotechnology industry it has spawned. In Part II, the note reviews the federal government's regulatory response to these developments. The analysis in Part III identifies two crucial flaws in the present system of biotechnology regulation: its uncertainty will stifle commercial development in biotechnology, and it will not produce sufficient data to enable regulators adequately to assess the special risks created by deliberate releases. 9 After examining governmental efforts to assess similar risks in the nuclear power industry, the part argues that regulators of deliberate releases should assemble a central data base of information about each release for use in future risk assessment. In Part IV, the note recommends immediate modification of the regulatory scheme to clarify agency jurisdiction and statutory authority, to stiffen reporting requirements, and to create a centralized data bank. The part also suggests that the EPA adopt a longterm strategy of incorporating research scientists into the regulatory process, in order to keep pace with the rapidly changing science of biotechnology. The note concludes that limited statutory reform and a consistent data base available to expert regulators will improve risk assessment and enable the safe development of a vigorous biotechnology industry.
in part, vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985) . Judge Sirica also enjoined further NIH approval of any other deliberate release experiments pending preparation of a "programmatic" Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addressing the broad environmental concerns involved in authorizing deliberate release experiments, as required by § 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982) . See Foundation on Econ. Trends, 587 F. Supp. at 769; infra note 56 (discussing NEPA's EIS requirements). This portion of the decision was reversed on appeal. See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 158-60 (D.C. Cir. 1985) . These decisions are discussed in detail at infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
6 The initial experiment involved application of ice-minus bacteria to potato plants. See Norman, Judge Halts Gene-Splicing Experiment, 224 Sci. 962, 962 (1984) . The second experiment involved application of the same strain of bacteria to 2,400 strawberry plants. See Hilts & Henderson, EPA Clears Way for Release of New Antifrost Microbe, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1985, at A2, col. 5.
7The biotechnology company was Advanced Genetic Sciences, Inc. See Hilts & Henderson, supra note 6, at A2, col. 5. [Vol. 72:1529 Scientists then insert these DNA segments into another organism's DNA. The DNA inserted in this manner permanently alters the DNA of the second organism and is reproduced in its offspring."' Pittsburgh-eating rutabagas notwithstanding, genetically altered microbes promise efficient solutions to environmental, medical, and agricultural problems that have puzzled scientists for years. Biotechnology's wide range of potential applications has attracted considerable commercial interest. Industry laboratories are already producing and selling artificial human insulin and human growth hormone in substantial quantities, 11 7 and large-scale commercial production of aspartame using rDNA techniques began in 1983.18 The Office of Technology Assessment predicts that current biotechnological techniques will soon make possible the production of pharmaceuticals such as antibiotics and vaccines, additives, sweeteners, and other food products, and many types of industrial chemicals.
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1 9 The late 1980's may see sales of biotechnological products for pollution control alone exceed six billion dollars, and annual sales of all biotechnological products may amount to over forty billion dollars by the year 2000.20 In light of these predictions, it is not surprising that commercial investment in biotechnology has been extensive. DuPont, for example, has invested over 150 million dollars in rDNA research facilities. 21 The industry presently contains over three hundred companies, 22 and to-tal investment in these companies exceeds three billion dollars. 2 3 Although the first commercial applications of biotechnology occurred in the pharmaceutical industry' 4 many of the most promising products of biotechnology are nonpharmaceutical substances that entail the environmental release of rDNA microbes. 25 Released microbes may enhance the recovery of underground oil and minerals, and may be used as pesticides, as well as for hazardous waste detoxification and other purposes. 2 ' 6 Perhaps the two best known examples of rDNA microbes designed for environmental release are the ice-minus bacterium that provoked the controversy in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler" and the oil-eating bacterium that prompted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty. (1984) . The pharmaceutical industry was able to commercialize biotechnology early because initial federal funds for genetic research targeted biomedical applications, the industry already had experience in converting basic research to commercial levels of production, and profit margins on pharmaceutical products were high enough to enable them to recapture research and development costs. See id.
21 See id. at 217-25; Staff Report, supra note 22, at 3. 26 See Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 24, at 217-25; Staff Report, supra note 22, at 3. The ice-minus bacterium, an rDNA modified version of a bacterium found on many plants, was developed by Dr. Steven Lindow of the University of California at Berkeley. See Hirano, Ecology and Physiology of Pseudomonas Syringae, Bio/Technology, Dec. 1985, at 1073. The naturally occurring strain increases plant sensitivity to frost, causing frost to form in plant tissue at relatively mild temperatures. See Environmental Implications of Genetic Engineering: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1983) [hereinafter House Hearing on Environmental Implications] (statement of Dr. Steven Lindow, Dept. of Plant Pathology, Univ. of Calif. at Berkeley). The ice-minus strain, which is able to colonize on plants formerly inhabited by the naturally occurring strain, causes frost to form on the plants only at lower than normal temperatures. The ice-minus mutant also occurs naturally in small numbers, but can be produced in large quantities using rDNA techniques. See id. at 67. The savings from this lowering of the frost point in citrus fruits and other crops could range from one to three billipn dollars per year. Staff Report, supra note 22, at 14. Sales from a commercially viable ice-minus bacterium might reach $100 million per year. Biotechnology: Strawberry Fields Forever, Time, Nov. 11, 1985, at 74.
28 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (upholding the patentability of genetically altered life forms). The petroleum-consuming microbe that was the subject of controversy in Chakrabarty has commercial potential because it can degrade the carbon compounds found in petroleum. See id. at 305. The microbe converts petroleum sludge to several more innocuous compounds. See id. Other rDNA microbes also may be able to consume pollutants like the di-
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The methods used to produce rDNA microbes designed for deliberate release are the same as those used for other rDNA microbes. Deliberate release microbes, however, differ in one significant way: unlike most other rDNA microbes, which die outside the laboratory 29 they are designed to survive in the environment long enough to perform a designated task. For this reason, they present significantly greater risks than other rDNA products. 30 Moreover, microbes designed for environmental release are potentially hazardous, because they may have acquired traits that enable them to outcompete existing organisms in the environment, disturbing the ecological balance of an entire area. 3 1 Altered microbes released in the environment may also interact with other organisms, exchanging genetic material and creating potentially hazardous new microbes. 3 2 In addition, deliberately released microbes may cause disease or create toxins hazardous to plants, animals, or humans. 33 Although escaped laboratory-bound microbes present many of the same dangers, the fact that deliberately released microbes are designed to survive in the environment exacerbates these problems. Deliberate release microbes may also pose greater risks than ordinary, oxin found at Times Beach, Missouri. See House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 60 (statement of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty, Dept. of Microbiology, Univ. of Illinois Medical Center). Similar microbes may be an efficient means of degrading hazardous wastes in landfills and dumpsites. See id. The commercial potential for these waste-consuming microbes will grow as more toxic wastes are produced.
" For an explanation of why laboratory organisms die outside the laboratory, see infra text accompanying notes 235-36. There has never been a reported incident endangering humans or the environment with the laboratory-based research. See House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 38 (statement of Geoffrey M. Karny The promise of biotechnological products is matched by the inherent risks involved in an area that scientists are only beginning to understand. These risks are troublesome not because they are highly probable, but because measuring them is tremendously difficult. Establishing the likelihood that an altered microbe will severely disrupt the environment-or worse-is complex and uncertain. The confusion and inadequacy of the federal regulatory system adds to this uncertainty. In February of 1975 the NIH, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the National Science Foundation (NSF) jointly sponsored a conference for scientists involved in rDNA research at the Asilomar Conference Center in Pacific Grove, California. See Dworkin, Science, Society, and the Expert Town Meeting: Some Comments on Asilomar, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1471, 1472 (1978); Pendorf, supra, at 898. The scientists at Asilomar developed and proposed guidelines to ensure the containment of rDNA organisms in the laboratory. Some criticism was leveled at the lack of time the conference devoted to policy discussion and by its exclusion of the press and general public. See Dworkin, supra, at 1472-78. The general public first became concerned about the potential hazards of rDNA research as a result of the publicity surrounding the Asilomar Conference. Scientists were uncertain of the amount cerned not only about possible leaks of microbes from laboratories, but also about the ethical consequences of modifying the genetic code. 39 Congress responded to these concerns by holding several hearings 40 and introducing at least twelve bills regarding the regulation of rDNA research. 4 Despite the intense congressional interest, however, no legislation emerged.
42
In response to the growing concern over rDNA research in the scientific community and among the general public, the NIH, which funds most academic rDNA research, directed its Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (NIHRAC) to develop guidelines for rDNA research. 4 In July 1976, the NIH issued its first Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (the Guidelines)." The Guidelines focused on preventing the accidental escape of rDNA products." Five types of research were considered too hazardous to be performed, including the "deliberate release into the environment of any organism containing a recom- (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
For a federal agency, the decision whether to prepare an EIS has three steps. First, the agency must determine whether the proposed action is subject to a "categorical exclusion," which means that the agency need not prepare either an EIS or an Environmental Assessment. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(2) (1985). Categorical exclusions are granted to actions that "do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment." Id. § 1508.4. If the agency determines that the activity is not excluded, it must prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA). Id. § 1501.4(b). An EA must " [b] riefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact." Id. § 1508.9(a)(1). Finally, the agency must determine, based on the EA, whether the action will have a significant impact on the environment; if it will, the agency must prepare an EIS. See id. § 1501.4(c). The EIS evaluation process may be reqtdired both for a single agency action (such as approval of a specific microbial release) or for an action establishing a broad program or process (such as the NIHRAC procedure for reviewing deliberate release experiments). The latter is known as a "programmatic" EIS. See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 159 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
HeinOnline --72 Va. L. Rev. 1538 Rev. 1986 Second, the plaintiffs maintained that the procedure used to approve this particular deliberate release-the ice-minus experiment-did not comply with NEPA. 57 Judge John Sirica agreed and granted a preliminary injunction, pending compliance with NEPA, against both the iceminus experiment and future NIH approval of any other deliberate release experiments.
5 Judge Sirica explicitly exempted NIH approval of commercial deliberate release experiments, however, on the ground that NEPA applied only to federally funded institutions.
59
Scientists immediately criticized the injunction against the ice-minus experiment 0 and predicted that it would have a "tremendous chilling effect" on research." The exemption for commercial research was described as a "gaping loophole"
' that created a "double standard." 8 3 One commentator even suggested that the exemption for commercial research would induce a "drain of scientists from the universities into industry or out of the country."'"
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the injunction against the ice-minus experiment but vacated the injunction against future NIH approval of any other deliberate releases as overly broad. 5 In upholding the ice-minus injunction, the District of Columbia Circuit found the NIH's review of the possible environmental consequences of the experiment insufficient to satisfy the requirements of NEPA. 8 
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had not considered the environmental effects of the microbe's dispersion, 6 the court stated that "[ignoring possible environmental consequences will not suffice. Nor will a mere conclusory statement that the number of recombinant-DNA-containing organisms will be small and subject to processes limiting survival. In regard to the injunction against future approval of deliberate release experiments, the court noted that development of a new technology with unknown consequences was precisely the type of governmental action that typically required programmatic review. 9 It concluded, however, that NEPA did not require the NIH to prepare a programmatic EIS before beginning to consider applications for approval of deliberate release experiments. 70 Instead, the court found it sufficient that the NIH engage in rigorous case-by-case examination of the environmental consequences of each deliberate release proposal. In a concurring opinion, Judge MacKinnon asserted that the experiment presented minimal risks, but that the NIH should have performed the proper assessments of environmental consequences to address "lay concerns" with the new technology. 72 He then criticized the Foundation on Economic Trends for failing to object to the approval of deliberate release experiments during the NIH review process. 73 Thus, although the court reaffirmed the NIH's regulatory authority under NEPA, it also recognized that protracted litigation could damage rDNA research. A significant jurisdictional question remained. The development of the NIH Guidelines had inadvertently created a double standard: 74 whereas scientists conducting rDNA research in facilities receiving federal funds were required to comply with the Guidelines, 75 those in private nonprofit laboratories and commercial enterprises were not. 76 
B. Regulation of Commercial Deliberate Releases
Soon after the commercialization of biotechnology began, academic scientists and members of the biotechnology industry recognized the need for greater coordination among the federal regulatory agencies sharing responsibility for rDNA.
7
" Uncertain of the regulatory picture, biotechnology companies viewed jurisdictional disputes among agencies with suspicion 78 and were less eager to invest in product development. 79 To address these problems, the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment formed the Working Group on Biotechnology "to determine whether the existing regulatory apparatus was adequate to consider the safety and health and environmental effects of modern biotechnology as its products and processes move from contained research laboratories to the marketplace." 80 To enhance agency cooperation, the Coordinated Framework establishes a two-tiered mechanism. As initially proposed, the lower tier consisted of an rDNA science advisory committee in each affected federal agency" and the upper tier of a science advisory committee, called the Biotechnology Science Board (BSB), which had substantial power to ensure interagency cooperation and consistency through its review of regulatory procedures in the individual agencies. 85 When the double-review process was attacked as cumbersome and unnecessary, 86 the Working Group responded by stripping the BSB of most of its supervisory powers, remarking somewhat ironically that it believed "interagency information sharing and coordination could be [more] effectively carried out by a structure offering interagency coordination. In its final form, the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee (BSOC), as the Biotechnology Science Board is now called, consists of representatives from NIH, the EPA, the National Science Foundation, the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Agriculture. The BSCC has four functions: to coordinate scientific information sharing and problem solving; to promote the development of consistent review procedures and assessment techniques by affected agencies; to foster agency cooperation on new scientific issues; and to identify important gaps in scientific understanding of rDNA. 8 In short, the BSCC does not oversee the individual agencies, but operates solely in an advisory capacity." Whether the "watered down" BSCC will have the authority to coor- 90 See Hilts, supra note 77, at A6, col. 1 (reporting comment of David T. Kingsbury, Assistant Director for Biological, Behavioral and Social Sciences for the National Science Foundation, that "[w]e are not going to spend our time looking over agency shoulders and saying 'You made a mistake in releasing something, and we'll have to bring it back' ").
Biotechnology
dinate federal biotechnology regulation effectively is doubtful.
9 ' To accompany the Coordinated Framework, the EPA prepared an agency policy statement (Microbial Product Policy). 2 In the Microbial Product Policy, the EPA has asserted its authority to serve as the principal regulatory agency for the deliberate release of rDNA microbes.
9 3 At the same time, the EPA has relinquished authority over genetically engineered plants and animals. 94 Under the Microbial Product Policy, the EPA will regulate commercial production of rDNA microbes under two principal statutes: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)" 5 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 9
Statutory Regulation Under FIFRA
FIEFRA is the principal statute governing the testing, distribution, and use of pesticides.
9 7 Because many releases of rDNA microbes will involve pesticides, FIFRA will play a major role in the regulation of the biotechnology industry.
9 8 Under FIFRA, the EPA cannot authorize the sale or distribution of a pesticide or other regulated substance until it collects sufficient data to ensure that "when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice, [ Id. will extend FIFRA to genetically engineered microorganisms" 0 2 that are considered to be "pesticides" under FIFRA section 2(u).
3
The EPA's registration requirements and testing procedures for nonrDNA microbial pesticides are designed to enable the agency to evaluate the risks of "infectivity, pathogenicity, toxicity, host range, virulence, and survivability."" 1 4 RDNA microbial pesticides present many of the same risks as their non-rDNA counterparts, but may have greater survivability, enhanced virulence, and greater ability to compete with indigenous organisms. 1 0 5 In response to these risks, the EPA will apply the current microbial pesticide regulations to rDNA microbes,' 0 6 but may require more detailed data for use in assessing the risks of particular rDNA microbial pesticides.
1 7
The EPA requires producers of new non-rDNA pesticides to submit data sufficient to indicate the identity, molecular composition, potential harmful effects, and environmental fate of the pesticide. 08 For rDNA pesticides, the EPA may require certain additional data, including information on the specific gene sequence inserted in the microbe, the method used to insert that sequence, the regions in the gene that control its expression, the new traits that it expresses, and the likelihood that the gene will be transferred to other organisms in nature. 0 9
After an applicant has submitted the required data for the new pesti- Most nonmicrobial organisms considered to be biological control agents, on the other hand, are currently exempt from FIFRA because they are regulated by other agencies. See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,320; 40 C.F.R. § 162.5(c)(4) (1986). The EPA defines "biological control agent" as "any living organism applied to or introduced into the environment to control the population or biological activities of another life form which is considered a pest under section 2(t) of FIFRA." Id. § 162.5(c) (2 170 (1986) . Specific data requirements vary depending upon the "general use patterns" of the pesticide. The uses are grouped into six categories: "terrestial, aquatic, greenhouse, forestry, domestic outdoor, or indoor." Id. Depending upon the general use pattern, data are required in four categories. First, data are required regarding product analysis to determine the identity of the pesticide and possible formation of unintentional by-products. Second, residue data are required to determine the amount and type of compounds that remain after application of the pesticide. Third, toxicology data are required to identify possible toxicity. Fourth, "non-target organism and environmental expression" data are required to assess the impact of the pesticide on the environment. See id. for limited uses of an unregistered pesticide."" The EUP allows an applicant to bypass the lengthy delays and expense of registration in the early development of a pesticide. Small-scale field testing of a pesticide may be conducted without even an EUP, however, so long as the principal purpose of the test is to establish the pesticide's effectiveness, rather than to provide actual pest control." 2 The EPA has recognized that microbial pesticides have several characteristics that may make even small-scale field tests of such pesticides quite dangerous: replication, dispersion, and resistance to "natural control." 113 As a result, the EPA requires individuals to notify it before conducting any field studies, regardless of size or purpose, with microbial pesticides." 4 This notification process is designed to enhance the EPA's .. may replicate and spread beyond the site of application. Further, nonindigenous and genetically engineered microbial pesticides may not be subject to natural control or dissipation mechanisms; they may be capable of spreading beyond the site of application . . . ." Id.
"' See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,320. The amount of information that the notice must include varies depending on how risky the EPA believes the microorganism to be. Level II microbes, which are considered more dangerous, include "[m]icrobial pesticides formed by deliberately combining genetic material from organisms of different genera, genetically engineered microbial pesticides derived from source organisms that are pathogens . . . and nonindigenous pathogenic microbial pesticides." Id. at 23,321. These microbes are subject to stringent reporting requirements. Level I microbes, for which less information must be submitted, include all other microbial pesticides. Information that must be submitted for Level I microbes is as follows:
(1) Identity of the microorganism, including characteristics, and means and limits of detection.
(2) Description of the natural habitat of the microorganism or its parental strains, including information on natural predators, parasites, and competitors. ability to restrict small-scale field tests of potentially hazardous microbes.
Statutory Regulation Under TSCA
The EPA will regulate non-pesticidal commercial microbes, DNA sequences, and their products under TSCA. The purpose of TSCA is "to provide a comprehensive mechanism for addressing the hazards to health and the environment of chemical substances. The definition specifically excludes mixtures, pesticides, tobacco and tobacco products, nuclear materials, and food, drug, or cosmetic devices." See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,886. This approach was reaffirmed in the final policy. See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,324. According to the EPA, most microorganisms produced for environmental, industrial, or consumer uses, including those that may be developed for "conversion of biomass for energy, pollutant degradation, enhanced oil recovery, metal extraction and concentration, and certain non-food and non-pesticidal agricultural applications," are potentially regulable under TSCA. See id. Specifically excluded from the scope of the statutue, however, are foods, food additives, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, and pesticides, as well as plants and animals. See id.
119 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,886.
sequences are "organic substances of a particular molecular identity."120 The EPA will regulate two types of microbes under TSCA-those that have been modified by the insertion of genetic material from organisms of different genera,' 2 ' and those that are pathogenic or have received genetic material from organisms that are pathogens.' 22 The former will be regulated by the premanufacture notification (PMN) requirements of TSCA section 5(a)(1)(A);1 23 the latter by the significant new use report (SNUR) requirements of TSCA section 5(a)(1)(B), whenever they are released into the environment.
124
TSCA The EPA considers all microorganisms deliberately formed to contain genetic material from different genera, except for those in which the added genetic material consists only of well-characterized, non-coding regulatory regions, to be new chemical substances subject to the PMN reporting requirements. 27 Once a microbe has been classified as a new chemical substance, section 5(a)(1)(A) requires commercial manufacturers to notify the EPA of their intention to import or produce it ninety days before beginning to do so. 128 The PMN must include a wide variety of known or reasonably ascertainable information about the 
substance. 1 2 9
The EPA recognized that organisms and compounds that do not fall within the statutory definition of new chemical substance-and thus within the PMN reporting requirements-may also present significant risks to health or the environment. 30 The Microbial Product Policy suggests that the SNUR provisions of TSCA section 5 may be used, as a supplement to the PMN requirements, to require notification to the EPA in these cases.'"' Section 5(a)(2) authorizes the EPA, upon consideration of all relevant factors, to issue a rule declaring that a particular use of a chemical substance already listed on the Inventory is a "significant new use."' 3 2 Once the EPA has issued a SNUR, section 5(a)(1)(B) requires any individual planning to manufacture or process the substance for that use to notify the EPA ninety days before doing so, through a submission similar to a PMN.' 33 TSCA section 5(h)(3), however, provides a significant exemption from the PMN and SNUR requirements for chemical substances produced in small quantities solely for research and development purposes.
3 4 "Small quantities" have been defined by rule to be those not greater than reasonably necessary for research and development purposes. 13 Notification is not required under TSCA for deliberate release experiments meeting this definition, although the EPA can require data submissions where necessary."" The small quantities exemption created a much-discussed gap in the federal oversight of deliberate release microbes: whereas academic research-that is, research undertaken with the support of federal funds-required NIH approval, 37 the same research, if performed on a small scale by commercial enterprises, was exempt from both NIHRAC review and from TSCA's PMN requirements.
38
The 1986 Microbial Product Policy fills this gap by a rulemaking that excludes from the small quantities exemption living microbes released into the environment.
3 " Thus, biotechnology companies planning to release rDNA microbes into the environment will be required to submit substantial data before performing any field tests. Although this rule will close the commercial deliberate release gap, it will narrow the statutory definition of "small quantity" to "no quantity" in the case of deliberate release microbes. This rule is of dubious validity and likely to provoke litigation by the affected companies. In sum, the Coordinated Framework and the EPA's Microbial Product Policy comprise a complex attempt to sort out the "labyrinth"'' of federal biotechnology regulation using existing statutes. The proposals also represent an attempt on the part of the federal government to strike a balance between promoting the biotechnology industry and protecting human health and the environment.
III. CRITICISMS OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The underlying difficulty with the present system of biotechnology regulation is that biotechnology involves new processes that in many cases cannot be adequately dealt with by existing environmental statutes.
' In

3
See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,891. ,39 See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,330 ("Because of their ability to reproduce and therefore increase beyond the amount originally released, living microorganisms used in the environment cannot be considered to meet the commonly understood meaning of 'small quantities' for research and development, and thus do not qualify for the exemption.").
140 A second problem exists. Because TSCA § 5(i) defines manufacturing and processing to mean "manufacturing or processing for commercial purposes," 15 U.S.C. § 2604(i) (1982), pure academic research conducted without federal funds would remain outside the regulatory purview of the NIH Guidelines and of the EPA under TSCA. See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,881; see also 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,331 (discussing the exemption for noncommercial research and development).
"I See Flaherty, A Brave New World for Biotech Lawyers, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 8, 1984, at 27, col. 1.
142 Legislation designed to remedy some of the problems identified here has been introduced and is pending in both houses of Congress. On December 17, 1985, Sen. Durenberger (R-Minn.) and Sen. Baucus (D-Mont.) submitted S. 1967, entitled "A Bill to amend the Toxic Substances Control Act to protect the environment and human health from adverse effects caused by the release of genetically engineered micro-organisms into the environment, to promote the safe use of genetically-engineered micro-organisms, and for other purposes." S. 1967, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 (1986) . For a the absence of legislation specifically addressing biotechnology, however, agencies that have traditionally regulated similar activities have been tempted to extend their authority to biotechnology. Yet prior regulation of similar products or industries does not necessarily mean an agency has the ability to handle the complex problems associated with biotechnology. Although the potential risks of biotechnology resemble those addressed by existing environmental statutes, they are often more difficult to assess. Existing statutes may suffice in some cases, forestalling the need for new and potentially misguided legislation. But when questionable statutory interpretations are required to extend the reach of existing legislation, the inevitable court challenges-and the regulatory readjustments that follow-may stymie commercial development in an industry that relies upon constant innovation and clear guidelines.
A. Regulatory Uncertainty
Jurisdictional Confusion
The Coordinated Framework was developed to coordinate the federal oversight of biotechnology and to close regulatory gaps. Nevertheless, one commentator has called the federal agencies' attempts to divide responsibilities "a patchwork of conflicting regulatory policies. ' " 4 3 The idea of the BSCC was to untangle jurisdictional problems, but to prevent the addition of a time-consuming layer in the regulatory process, the current Coordinated Framework gives the BSCC limited powers and membership, which severely restricts its ability to accomplish its mission. In fact, Senator Albert Gore (D-Tenn) has stated that "the council is toothless and just a kind of discussion group.' 1 4 4 Although an actual evaluation of the success of the BSCC will require some experience with its operation, the chances of the BSCC operating effectively do not appear good.1 4 5 Without some assurance of order in the regulatory structure, the strength of the biotechnology industry will be impaired. NIHRAC and the NIH Guidelines have been extremely successful in discussion of the provisions of both bills, see infra notes 220-34 and accompanying text.
143 Pendorf, supra note 38, at 921. 144 Sun, supra note 91, at 1016. M Harvey Price, director of the Industrial Biotechnology Association, believes that neither the BSCC nor its parent committee resolves the confusion about jurisdictional control. See id.
148 See Hilts, supra note 77, at A6, col. 1 (reporting that companies are uncertain about which agency to go to for approval); Comments on Cabinet Gene-Splice Plan, 127 Sci. News, May 4, 1985, at 280 (reporting statement of Jack Doyle, staff member of the Environmental Policy Institute, that there is "an increasing sense of confused responsibility in the federal establishment").
promoting academic research while allaying public fears about rDNA techniques, but because the Guidelines are not compulsory for commercial enterprises, a resurgence of public concern is occurring. Until 1985 no companies were prepared to perform deliberate release field tests of rDNA products. 147 In 1985, however, a private corporation-Advanced Genetic Sciences, Inc. (AGS)-sought and obtained EPA approval for the release of the ice-minus bacteria developed by Dr. Lindow.2 4 8 Although the NIHRAC's approval of the release sponsored by Dr. Lindow was enjoined by a federal district court, 49 AGS, which as a private enterprise was not required to gain NIHRAC approval, was not affected by the injunction. Instead, it applied for and was granted EPA permission to field test the ice-minus bacteria, 150 triggering a second suit by the Foundation on Economic Trends.
151
Months before the EPA approved the field test, AGS had performed its own unauthorized test, injecting the bacteria into trees growing on the two-acre roof of its Oakland, California headquarters. 52 Although AGS contended that the experiment was "contained" and therefore safe, the EPA later discovered that "a substantial number of the more than 45 trees leaked sap where the syringe was inserted,"' 53 possibly permitting insects and birds to carry the bacteria beyond the roof and disproving the claim of containment. In addition, three trees developed cankers, indicating "an adverse reaction to the microbe,"' 154 a reaction that AGS failed to report to the EPA. . 25 (D.D.C. 1986) . The court rejected a motion for a preliminary injunction against EPA approval of the experiment on the ground that the Foundation on Economic Trends was not likely to be able to establish that the EPA failed to follow the procedural requirements of FIFRA and NEPA or that the EPA failed to consider adequately the risks of the field test. See id. at 28-29. The court declined to grant summary judgment for the EPA, however, because the EPA was investigating allegations of wrongdoing by AGS, and the EPA's possible revocation of the permit "would moot any decision as to the permit's propriety." See id. at 29.
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[Vol. 72:1529 responded by fining the company and withdrawing its permit to test the microbe.
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The absence of a clear federal regulatory policy and the perceived inadequacy of the existing policy has provoked not only an unauthorized test and lawsuits, but also state and local governmental actions to prevent rDNA microbial research and testing. For example, despite the lengthy NIH and EPA review and two court challenges of the ice-minus field test, the Monterey County, California, Board of Supervisors halted the field test sponsored by AGS in February 1986.157 Many other local governments have passed restrictions on various forms of laboratory-based rDNA research.'" 8 In addition, the New Jersey legislature is considering a bill that would regulate biotechnology releases. 1 5 9 Given the growing public fear of rDNA deliberate releases, localities may produce even more extensive regulations in the future. State and local regulation will compound the time and expense required by biotechnology companies to gain approval for deliberate releases, with questionable environmental benefits. As these developments demonstrate, the Coordinated Framework and the NIH Guidelines alone are insufficient to allay the public concern about whether future deliberate releases by biotechnology companies will be adequately regulated. 
The Applicability of TSCA
The EPA monitors at least fourteen microbial pesticides under FIFRA' 6 ' without difficulty, and the statute should be able to address rDNA microbial pesticides without significant problems. The proposed regulation of rDNA deliberate releases under TSCA, on the other hand, presents several problems. Although the legislative history indicates that Congress intended TSCA to serve as a "gap filler" for other environmental laws, 162 so that applying it to biotechnology would not contravene Congress' general purposes, there is no evidence that Congress ever considered the possibility that the statute would regulate biotechnology. 163 The technology was still in its infancy during this period, 6 4 and it is unclear whether Congress intended TSCA's gap-filling role to encompass only existing gaps, or also to include gaps that might arise in the future.
Because the legislative history does not address biotechnology, a court deciding whether TSCA can be used to regulate biotechnology must make its determination on the basis of other factors. A threshold question is whether TSCA's "chemical substance" definition" 6 5 can be read to cover rDNA microbes. The regulation of nucleic sequences is uncontested under the definition, but the EPA's plans to extend its regulatory powers to the living microbes that contain these nucleic sequences have caused some controversy.1 6 7 The definition also requires, however, that a chemical substance be "of a particular molecular identity.11 6 Living organisms are not of a particular molecular identity; in fact, their exact chemical composition is Statements made by EPA officials just after passage of TSCA indicate that the EPA itself had some reservations about classifying life forms as chemical substances. As an EPA official stated in a 1977 letter to the chairman of a Senate subcommittee:
[A]lthough there is a general consensus that recombinant DNA molecules are "chemical substances" within the meaning of section 3 of TSCA, it is not at all clear whether a host organism containing recombined DNA molecules fits-or was intended to fit-that definition .... If such organisms are subject to TSCA on the grounds that they are a "combination of ... substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction," the Agency might logically have to include all living things in the definition of "chemical substance"-an interpretation which I am confident the Congress neither contemplated nor intended.' 1 7
On the other hand, the EPA shortly thereafter rejected a comment suggesting that bacteria and fungi were not chemical substance with the statement that the chemical substances definition "does not exclude life forms which may be manufactured for commercial purposes and nothing in the legislative history would suggest otherwise. it can be argued that Congress would have explicitly excluded life forms if it had so intended. 174 In addition, there is at least one administrative precedent (predating the current attempts to regulate biotechnology) for applying TSCA to living organisms: substances labeled as of unknown or variable composition, complex reaction products, or biological materials-among which are included bacteria, fungi, yeasts, and microorganisms-are listed on the TSCA Chemical Substances Inventory. 1 7 5 In fact, the original Inventory instructions expressly required the reporting of bacteria, yeast, and fungi.1
Other elements of TSCA, however, support a determination that it is not applicable to biotechnology. TSCA refers to the "manufacture" of chemical substances, 1 7 and bioengineered life forms are not manufactured from whole cloth, though they may be altered. Similarly, the exemption for small quantities used in research and development indicates that Congress did not believe living microbes were covered by TSCA, because even small quantities of living organisms can create substantial environmental and human health problems when they multiply.' 7 8 The threat of such microbial reproduction has led the EPA to exclude all rDNA deliberate release experiments from the TSCA exemption for small quantities, by issuing a rule that defines small quantities of deliberate release microbes as none whatsoever. Many questions exist concerning the applicability of TSCA to living organisms. These questions will almost certainly lead to court challenges of the EPA's proposed inclusion of living organisms in TSCA, 80 causing delays that will impede the development of the commercial biotechnology industry. Yet even if the proposed application of TSCA to living organisms withstands court scrutiny, as seems likely, other problems will surface. AGS's unauthorized testing of the ice-minus bacteria illustrates the private sector's impatience with regulatory and judicial delays. But it also points to a second flaw in the present regulatory system: the system does Supreme Court's opinion in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). In Chakrabarty, the Court held that a genetically engineered bacterium constituted a "manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning of the federal patent statute, id. at 308-18, despite the fact that genetic technology was unforeseen at the time that statute was enacted, id. at 314-18. The Chakrabarty analogy was first suggested by Rep. Gore in the House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 32.
178 See Staff Report, supra note 22, at 125-26. Administrative precedents may be useful in construing a statute. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) .
7' See Staff Report, supra note 22, at 125-26. 177 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1982).
178 See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (discussing potential hazards of microbial release).
1'
See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,330; supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
180 See Sun, supra note 166, at 823.
not provide regulators with sufficient information on the risks posed by genetically engineered microbes.
B. Inadequate Data Accumulation and Evaluation
The Weakness of TSCA
The most important weakness of TSCA stems from the fact that it is not a "permitting" statute-a manufacturer of a new chemical substance need not secure a permit or a license before beginning production, so long as he submits a PMN report.' 8 ' The PMN must contain a "full report" of any test data about the substance's health and environmental effects in the manufacturer's possession or control. 182 But there is no requirement that the manufacturer develop these data before submitting the PMN, and a PMN lacking the information is considered complete so long as the manufacturer is not in possession or control of any such data.
1 83 After the PMN has been submitted, the EPA can require the manufacturer to conduct any testing reasonably necessary to develop these data, if it finds the PMN itself insufficient to enable it to predict the health and environmental effects. 84 But the EPA must first determine that the substance may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, 18 5 or that it will be produced in substaiitial quantities and either enter the environment in substantial quantities or result in substantial human exposure. 88 Thus, the burden of demonstrating that more data are required is on the EPA, not the manufacturer. Under such a regime, 181 See Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 126 (testimony of Prof. Thomas 0. McGarity, Univ. of Texas Law School). FIFRA, on the other hand, is a permitting statute-that is, it forbids a manufacturer of a new pesticide to proceed with its sale or distribution until the new pesticide is properly registered. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1982).
1'2 See 40 C.F.R. § 720.50(a)(3) (1986). By definition, this report should include "experimental methods and materials, results, discussion and data analysis, conclusions, references, and the name and address of the laboratory that developed the data." Id. However, these items need only be included if they are in the PMN submitter's possession or control. See id.
18'3 See id. For a description of this section, see 48 Fed. Reg. 41,132, 41,135 (Sept. 13, 1983) ("the absence of this information in the report submitted with the PMN will not make the PMN incomplete, because it is not in the submitter's possession or control"). This apportionment of the burden is problematic, because the EPA may have insufficient data to determine whether more data are necessary to fully evaluate the risks of the new substance. The EPA may only demand more information, however, where it can establish, on the basis of the data submitted with the PMN, that an unreasonable risk exists or a substantial exposure will occur.' 8 7 Moreover, the EPA must make this determination under substantial time pressure-if it fails to act within ninety days (extendable to 180 days) of the PMN's submission, the submitter may begin to produce the unevaluated substance.
88 Given these problems, the agency may fail to recognize the need to obtain additional data in many cases.' 88 This is particularly likely to occur in the case of rDNA products, where the potential risks of a substance are far from obvious and the underlying biochemistry of genetic recombination is only partially understood. " ' The question remains whether the EPA has the expert staff and sufficient funding to adequately regulate biotechnology in general and deliberate releases in particular. The EPA Office of Pesticide Programs administers FIFRA and has regulated microbial pesticides in the past. See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,883; see also House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 47 (statement of Geoffrey M. Karny, Senior Analyst, Biological Applications Program, Office of Technology Assessment) (reporting that the office administering FIFRA, the OPP, is "sophisticated" in its approach to evaluating the ecological impacts of genetically modified organisms). The Office of Toxic Substances, which administers TSCA, has less experience with microbial substances, cf. 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,326 (biotechnology companies are not yet submitting under TSCA), and a 1980 Government Accounting Office study revealed that the toxic substances program was understaffed. See House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 33 (statement of Geoffrey M. Karny, Senior Analyst, Biological Applications Program, Office of Technology Assessment). More recently, the EPA Office of Research and Development, which is responsible for developing many of the risk assessment techniques necessary to evaluate deliberate releases, has undergone massive budget cuts, prompting one congressman to remark that "there have been serious, damaging effects on the availability and quality of scientific information caused by inadequate public investment in ecological research." House Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 17, at 9 (statement of Rep. Gerry Sikorski, D-Minn.).
190 The 1986 Microbial Product Policy indicates that manufacturers planning environmental releases of regulated microbes "should assume, in the absence of data to the contrary, that the microorganisms may present a risk because of their potential to reproduce and exhibit new traits. Therefore, EPA will expect manufacturers to provide test and other data demonstrating the microorganisms' safety." 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,327. It appears from this language that the EPA is attempting to make an acrossthe-board finding that rDNA releases present an unreasonable risk sufficient to trigger the by their commercial release, for commercial releases will undoubtedly occur at levels substantially greater than the field tests.""
To assess the potential hazards of deliberate release, scientists must develop the capacity to predict the impact that both field tests and largescale commercial releases will have on the environment. This task, sometimes termed "predictive ecology,"' 19 7 attempts to forecast the changes in an environment caused by a single modification, such asthe introduction of a particular rDNA microbe. Yet current risk assessment techniques make it "extremely difficult, if not impossible" to accurately predict the probability, magnitude, or type of impact a particular rDNA microbe will have on the environment. 9 8 The principal reasons for this inability to assess the risks of deliberate release are the lack of a standard ecological methodology for evaluating the environmental consequences of rDNA organisms and the lack of a sound data base from which to extract principles useful in predicting future events. 99 Without an effective methodology in place, ready to catalog and analyze the effects of various deliberate releases, field testing will not significantly enhance regulators' ability to assess future risks. 200 And without a reliable data base, even the most sophisticated methodology will not enable regulators to make accurate predictions about the impact of future releases. In short, predictive ecology is an inexact science that falls short when asked to determine the environmental consequences of deliberately released rDNA microbes. 202 But the risks posed by these releases, which "' See Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 151 (testimony may be termed "low probability/high consequence" risks, 20 1 present great challenges for modern risk assessors. Evaluation of hazards with a small chance of occurrence and a high degree of complexity is always difficult; as physicist A.M. Weinberg has suggested, risk assessment in these areas is more "trans-science" than science.
20 4 In fact, Weisberg suggests that the assessment of low probability/high consequence risks involves little more than a political judgment. 20 5 Although the decision to permit a deliberate release may ultimately be political, by accumulating a sound data base of analogous experiences, regulators can assure that this political judgment is guided by the most accurate predictions possible within the intrinsic limits of modern risk assessment techniques. This data base must, however, preserve past experiences in a form that will enable regulators to use them to predict future events. As the nuclear power experience demonstrates, simply gathering large quantities of data is not enough.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates an industry presenting the same sort of low probability/high consequence risks as biotechnology.
2 0 6 The NRC has created safety data requirements similar to those used by the EPA under the current scheme-that is, requirements that focus on situation-specific data not easily transferred to similar incidents arising in the future. 20 7 Although the NRC often received sufficient quantities of data, a 1979 Government Accounting Office (GAO) study found that it did not define clearly the scope or format of the information required, 20 but instead allowed each of its three headquarters offices and five regional offices to determine individually the reporting requirements for nuclear safety data. 209 Moreover, the lack of uniformity in the data generated by the disparate reporting measures made it difficult for regulators to determine the relevance of one event to another, 2 1 0 which made it difficult to identify general principles useful in estimating future risks.
The GAO study demonstrated the need for systematic data collection and assessment in the nuclear power industry. In the federal government's current scheme for regulating biotechnology, the weakened BSCC cannot prevent the agencies involved from committing the same mistake.
2 " Under the current regulatory framework, for example, the NIH may develop data collection and assessment procedures inconsistent with those of the EPA, limiting the federal government's ability to make accurate risk assessments. Simply stated, the nuclear power example demonstrates that where risk data are not uniform, the usefulness of the data base to the industry as a whole is diminished. Because the BSCC lacks the authority to require uniform data collection, the current biotechnology regulatory scheme will not benefit from the nuclear industry's experience and will not promote accurate risk assessment as expeditiously as possible.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The analysis of the federal government's attempts to regulate rDNA deliberate releases demonstrates four fundamental weaknesses in the regulatory scheme. First, the scheme has not reduced the confusion over agency jurisdiction.
2 " The BSCC lacks the authority to settle jurisdictional questions and to compel agencies to coordinate activities such as the accumulation of data in a consistent form.
Second, applying TSCA to biotechnology without amending its provisions creates difficulties. The questionable application of the TSCA chemical substance definition to living organisms will result in further lit- 212 Although under the current scheme the two agencies may cooperate, the likelihood that they will do so more frequently than the different offices within the NRC is slim. battles about who will regulate biotechnology in the U.S.' ").
igation, delays, and uncertainty in the regulated industry." 4 Third, although risk assessment is admittedly difficult in low probability/high consequence fields, regulation under TSCA and FIFRA may fail to produce the data necessary to evaluate individual experiments or to increase the effectiveness of future risk assessment.
1 5 TSCA now places the burden on the already understaffed EPA to demonstrate that substances pose unreasonable risks before additional data may be required. But the scientific debate over the risks of rDNA technology constrains the agency's ability to determine whether unreasonable risks exist, thereby limiting its ability to demand additional information." Moreover, the voluntary TSCA requirements for data submission prevent the EPA from requiring that data be developed in a consistent fashion. As a result, data developed for the EPA may be subject to the same lack of uniformity that may occur on the interagency level, where the BSCC lacks the power to compel consistent data gathering. As experience in the nuclear power area indicates, large amounts of data are most valuable when they add to a common, assessable base of experience. Disparate or inconsistent data are much less valuable to risk assessors.
Finally, the regulatory scheme will not accommodate the speed at which the field of biotechnology advances. The advances will include not only new techniques for genetic recombinatiorl, but also advances in understanding the fundamental processes that underlie biotechnology. For example, researchers only recently learned the frequency with which different species of organisms may exchange genes in nature. 2117 The implications of this finding for biotechnology are immense. Because the addition of a harmful gene from another organism can render a seemingly innocuous microbe dangerous, regulators must now examine the likelihood that such exchange will occur when assessing the impact of a particular deliberate release.
The problems with the current regulatory scheme require both shortterm and long-term responses. The first three problems-jurisdictional confusion, uncertainty about the application of TSCA to biotechnology, and inadequate data requirements-call for immediate actions before the EPA approves further deliberate releases. The fourth problem-regulating a field in which both the technological processes and the underlying science are changing rapidly-should be addressed through long-term structural modifications.
A. Immediate Actions: Clarification of Agency Jurisdiction and Statutory Authority and Modification of Data Requirements
In the short term, with the impetus of international competition spurring federal policymakers to promote the domestic biotechnology industry, 21 8 a coherent regulatory scheme is essential to ensure that human health and the environment are protected. Clarification of agency jurisdiction and statutory authority will provide a degree of certainty to guide biotechnology industry actions, reduce duplicative agency efforts, close regulatory gaps, and produce more cost-effective regulation.
As a first step toward regulatory clarification, the Cabinet Council Working Group should strengthen and expand the authority of the BSCC, to enable it to untangle current and future jurisdictional disputes. Like the advisory mechanism first proposed in the 1984 Coordinated Framework, 219 the BSCC should focus much of its effort on clarifying agency authority. The strengthened BSCC should require that agencies gather and share data developed on the characteristics of DNA sequences in a consistent manner. This information should comprise a central data bank for risk assessment, to provide regulators with a functional base of information about rDNA research and specifically about the potential environmental effects of deliberately released rDNA microbes.
Second, Congress should amend TSCA to make clear that it applies to rDNA microbes. Congress is now considering two bills, 220 each of which attempts to improve the regulatory response to the biotechnology problem. The Senate bill, 22 1 cast in the form of an amendment to TSCA, is the superior medicine for biotechnology's regulatory ills, because it converts TSCA into a permitting statute for the purposes of rDNA regulation, 2 22 places the burden of demonstrating that a particular rDNA microorganism "will not cause an adverse effect on human health or the environment" on the producer, 22 ' and defines microbes subject to TSCA regula-tion in a broad fashion 22 4 that is consistent with the definition adopted by the EPA in the Microbial Product Policy. 2 25 Another positive feature of the Senate bill is its reformulation of the standard the EPA Administrator must satisfy before requiring a producer to provide more information. Whereas TSCA currently permits the Administrator to demand more information from a producer only upon a finding that the microbe "may reasonably" be harmful, 228 the Senate measure would authorize him to do so simply upon a determination that such information is "necessary. '227 Although the House bill also converts TSCA into a permitting statute, it would eliminate the concurrent regulation of genetically engineered microbes under FIFRA. 22 Nor is the House bill's definition of the genetically engineered microbes that are subject to TSCA regulation satisfactory. The bill defines "'genetically-engineered organism'" as "a bacterium, virus, fungus, plant cell, plant tissue, animal cell, or animal tissue which has been deliberately altered to contain genetic material derived from more than one taxonomic genus." 1 28 ' Predicating regulatory jurisdiction upon generic classifications may lead to unjustified loopholes in review, in which "intra-generi" by subjecting deliberate releases to permit requirements. 33 The measures also resolve the controversial application of TSCA's chemical substance definition to rDNA microorganisms by the addition of a specific provision covering genetically engineered microorganisms. Most importantly, both measures shift the burden of proving relative safety from the regulatory agency to the producer. 2 3 Finally, regulators should apply to the deliberate release problem a lesson learned from laboratory-bound rDNA research-the use of microbes that have been genetically crippled to survive only in particular environments. Much of the success of laboratory rDNA safety is the result of the use of microbes from which scientists have removed the gene for the production of an essential enzyme. 235 Because these microbes will survive only in laboratory environments to which scientists have added amounts of the missing enzyme, they die soon after they escape from the laboratory.
2 s The use of microbes similarly designed to exist only in particular environments would reduce the risks of deliberate release significantly. 234 See id. Similarly, federal regulations could require scientists to remove the gene for an essential compound from field-tested rDNA microbes whenever possible. Carefully designed microbes would survive only if the investigator applied the missing compound to the microbes in the field. For example, the EPA could have required that the AGS investigators remove the gene for the production of a metabolite from the ice-minus bacterium. Then, when the bacterium was applied to the strawberry plants as proposed, the metabolite could be sprayed onto the plants in the field. The microbes would survive with the added compound, but if they began to have an adverse environmental impact the investigators could control them by halting application of the missing compound.
The advantages of this biological containment mechanism are that investigators can field test rDNA microbes with relative safety, even where predictive ecology is unable to determine the probable environmental fate of the microbe. Although the self-destructor mechanism will require some additional expense at the experimental stage, much of the expense will be compensated by savings on additional greenhouse and laboratory simulations that investigators might have to perform without the mechanism. If the microbe proves to be safe in field tests, scientists could reinsert the missing gene at the commercial production stage. Alternatively, the EPA could require commercially produced rDNA microbes to lack the ability to produce a compound so that the safety mechanism will operate in large-scale microbial applications as well as field tests.
B. Long-Term Response: Adapting the EPA to Biotechnology Regulation
A recurring problem with the EPA's regulation of biotechnology is the complex nature of the biological issues involved. To be effective, regulators must be well versed in the current understanding of fundamental biological concepts, as well as in biotechnological processes. A thorough and current understanding of scientific issues is also necessary if the EPA is to retain the respect and full cooperation of the regulated industry, which is composed of highly trained scientists equipped with the most advanced instruments. Regulators who are scientists themselves can ensure that the EPA receives the data necessary to evaluate adequately the risks of rDNA technology. The use of scientist-regulators would also permit more efficient data collection. Industries that produce biotechnological products can generate data about those products more efficiently than can independent consultants or agency scientists. 2 3 8 Yet fear of manipulated or incomplete studies makes federal regulators reluctant to rely on industry-generated data. 39 Regulators who maintained active research programs in the same general field as the regulated industry, however, would be able to spot faulty or incomplete industry data.
The Division of Biochemistry and Biophysics of the Center for Drugs and Biologics of the Food and Drug Administration (the Center) provides an excellent a model for the regulatory oversight of a rapidly evolving field like biotechnology. The Center employs over 300 scientists who spend the majority of their time on basic rDNA research and their remaining time on regulatory assignments for the Center.
2 0 Because the Center provides so much time for basic research, the program attracts eminent scientists with active research programs. These scientist-regulators have gained the respect of their peers in the biotechnology industry. In fact, one government official asserts that scientists with knowledge of the subject matter are able to perform as much regulatory oversight .in twenty percent of their time as less informed regulators can working on a full-time basis. The Center's scientist-regulators provide the FDA with the benefits of efficiency, accurate regulatory supervision, and basic research. The EPA could use scientist-regulators in a similar fashion to improve its biotechnology regulatory strategy. By properly channeling industry research at an early stage, scientist-regulators could instruct biotechnology companies in efficient compliance with applicable regulations. Scientist-regulators could also supervise the production of safety data by the industry itself. With industry-submitted data subject to review by practicing scientists, regulatory supervision would be more accurate. Finally, the research generated by scientist-regulators would, of course, be of continuing value to society.
Although the EPA calls on research scientists in the final stages of its deliberate release review, 242 the success of the Center's scientist-regulators demonstrates the advantages of incorporating research scientists throughout the entire regulatory process. The EPA should evaluate the applicability of the Center's scientist-regulator program to its regulation of biotechnology generally and to deliberate releases in particular.
V. CONCLUSION
The biotechnology industry is a rapidly developing and highly competitive industry that has the potential to produce great benefits. Unfortunately, deliberate releases of rDNA microbes present significant risks as well. These low probability/high consequence risks differ from the risks presented by laboratory-based biotechnology and are difficult to evaluate with modern risk assessment techniques. As a result, the long experience of safety with laboratory rDNA research may not be indicative of the potential hazards of deliberate releases.
The current regulatory framework will not contribute to the improvement of risk assessment techniques. The federal government's current coordinating organization, the BSCC, lacks the authority to compel agencies to develop a central data bank. Yet without such a central storehouse of collective experience, assessment of the risks of rDNA research generally, and deliberate release in particular, will remain difficult. In addition, TSCA does not ensure that regulators will have enough information-or enough time-to make the initial finding necessary to permit them to require the submission of more data about a particular rDNA microbe. The EPA's attempts to graft biotechnology onto a statute primarily designed to control inert pollutants will result in delaying litigation, prolonging the uncertainty among biotechnology enterprises.
" ' The EPA has provided for a Scientific Advisory Committee composed of research scientists and others to advise the agency, modeled on the NIHRAC. See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,318.
